[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [FW1] Check Point FireWall-1 RDP Bypass Vulnerability
Urgent! There is a slight mistake in Revision 1.2 of this advisory. RDP is proprietary protocol used by CheckPoint and therefore not described by RFC908, this RFC describes a different protocol unfortunately also called "RDP". Here is the corrected version: FOR PUBLIC RELEASE ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Inside Security GmbH Vulnerability Notification Revision 1.3 2001-07-09 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The latest version of this document is available at http://www.inside-security.de/advisories/fw1_rdp.html ----------------------------------------------- Check Point FireWall-1 RDP Bypass Vulnerability ----------------------------------------------- Summary: It is possible to bypass FireWall-1 with faked RDP packets if the default implied rules are being used. RDP (Reliable Data Protocol, but not the one specified in RFC 908, a Check Point proprietary one) is used by FireWall-1 on top of the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) to establish encrypted sessions. FireWall-1 management rules allow arbitrary eitherbound RDP connections to traverse the firewall. Only the destination port (259) and the RDP command are verified by FireWall-1. By adding a faked RDP header to normal UDP traffic any content can be passed to port 259 on any remote host on either side of the firewall. Implied rules can't be easily modified or removed (except all together) with the FireWall-1 policy editor. Impact: Given access to hosts on both sides of a firewall a tunnel to bypass the firewall could be built using this vulnerability. Such access could be gained with a trojan horse that uses this vulnerability to connect from the inside back to the machine of the attacker. But also arbitrary connections from the outside to machines behind the firewall (even if they are supposedly totally blocked from the in- and outside by the firewall) can be established, for example to communicate with infiltrated programs like viruses. Affected systems: Check Point VPN-1(TM) & FireWall-1(R) Version 4.1 Releases tested: Build 41439 [VPN + DES] Build 41439 [VPN + DES + STRONG] Build 41716 [VPN + DES + STRONG] (SP2) Vendor status: The vulnerability has been reported to Check Point and a fix is scheduled for today. We want to thank Check Point Software Technologies for their quick reaction. Detailed description: As FireWall-1 rulesets are created they are translated into the INSPECT language (similar to C) and by default include the file $FWDIR/lib/base.def which itself includes $FWDIR/lib/crypt.def in line 259. Together they define protocol names and the so called implied rules (for FireWall-1 management). In line 62 the macro accept_fw1_rdp is defined to accept any eitherbound connection that matches the following characteristics: - Protocol UDP - Destination port 259 (RDP) - RDP Command RDPCRYPTCMD (100), RDPCRYPT_RESTARTCMD (101), RDPUSERCMD (150) or RDPSTATUSCMD (128). The RDP command types RDPCRYPT = {RDPCRYPTCMD,RDPUSERCMD,RDPSTATUSCMD} and RDPCRYPT_RESTART = {RDPCRYPT_RESTARTCMD} will permit traversal of faked RDP packets (regardless of the value of NO_ENCRYPTION_FEATURES, undefined by default). Proof of concept code: Proof of concept code has been submitted to Check Point. We are planning to make this code publicly available within a few days. Suggested workarounds: - Comment line 2646 of crypt.def ( accept_fw1_rdp; ) - Deactivate implied rules in the Check Point policy editor (and build your own rules for management connections). - Block UDP traffic to port 259 on your perimeter router. Credits: This vulnerability was found and documented by Jochen Thomas Bauer <[email protected]> and Boris Wesslowski <[email protected]> of Inside Security GmbH, Stuttgart, Germany. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ (C) 2001 Inside Security GmbH This notice may be redistributed freely provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, and include all date and version information. ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW. IN NO EVENT WILL INSIDE SECURITY GMBH BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST REVENUE, PROFIT OR DATA, OR FOR DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES HOWEVER CAUSED AND REGARDLESS OF ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SECURITY BULLETIN, EVEN IF INSIDE SECURITY GMBH HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. If any of the above provisions are held to be in violation of applicable law, void, or unenforceable in any jurisdiction, then such provisions are waived to the extent necessary for this disclaimer to be otherwise enforceable in such jurisdiction. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ================================================================================ To unsubscribe from this mailing list, please see the instructions at http://www.checkpoint.com/services/mailing.html ================================================================================
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